Introduction
Theater C2 has become increasingly reliant on high-tech command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks. While our global C4ISR network is a tremendous capability, it is also a potential Achilles heel. Proponents of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) might argue that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and his staff need not be located in theater to effectively conduct sustained combat operations. The successful C2 network developed for the War in Afghanistan proves this theory. However, a significant caveat should be noted; the enemy did not wage an information warfare (IW) campaign against our network. Future opponents may be able to disrupt our C4ISR network and resulting C2 structure. Therefore, we must have a self-contained theater C2 system.
A major transformation in military strategy over the past ten years has been to minimize the number of ground troops on the battlefield. Arguably, airpower has become the precision combat multiplier facilitating this. Airpower possesses "the nearmiraculous property of lengthening the arm of the government whilst shortening its purse." 1 Therefore, our proposed self-contained theater C2 system must be able to command and control air-centric operations. Air-centric operations conducted during the War in Afghanistan have relied heavily on Special Operations Forces (SOF) directing aircraft to targets in a near real-time environment. "A major lesson of Afghanistan is that SOF are the glue that enables joint, interagency, and multi-national forces to function as a team." 2 This being said, our proposed, self-contained theater C2 system must have "in-house" subject matter expertise to effectively employ SOF to coordinate air-centric operations.
This paper proposes that the Joint Force Maritime Component Command HQ (JFMCC) may have the best capability to provide C2 when geographically separated C2 has been compromised. Obviously, this thesis is limited to combat operations that have some degree of accessibility from the sea/littorals. Since the demise of the former Soviet Union in 1989, our mainstay "land-locked" opponent appears appeased. The majority of combat operations since have involved accessibility from the sea: the Gulf War and current Southwest Asia operations, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan. Combat operations supported from the sea/littorals seem to be a likely paradigm for the foreseeable future. Hence, the "floating infrastructure" that the JFMCC provides appears ideally suited for theater C2. The addition of a Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) capability to the JFMCC staff will be recommended. The SOLE provides the critical subject matter expertise for maximizing SOF's ability to coordinate air-centric operations.
A historical synopsis of air-centric operations will be presented to derive the critical variables of this process towards the JFMCC's ability to provide self-contained, "degraded operations" theater C2. The analysis will be focused on joint requirements that the JFMCC will require for SOF to coordinate air-centric operations. "General Kenney's first offensive air operation, a raid on Rabaul, New Britian, convinced MacArthur of his air commander's complete dedication to the joint mission and its strategy. Given complete and acknowledged command and control of all SWPA Air Forces, Kenney was able to re-organize, allocate resources, streamline logistics, and devise an air campaign which would be the critical element in MacArthur's island hopping strategy. Kenney's familiarity and competence with army and naval questions were indispensable for planning and fighting coherent joint campaigns." 
Korea
The Korean War was a textbook example of lack of unity of effort between the services. The period between WWII and the Korean War helped set the stage for the disjointed operations that prevailed. "Prewar budget and organizational struggles strongly 6 Ibid., 305. 7 Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, JFACC Primer (Washington, D.C.: August 1992), 4.
8 Ibid. affected relations between the services, resulting in poor cooperation." 9 This mindset continued throughout the war. Although there was limited tactical success with close air support (CAS), coordination was poor between major land and air operations.
"Disagreement between the services over air asset allocation centered around the centralized control concept of the Air Force and the dedicated air assets concept used by the Marine Corps." 10 The Navy opted to de-conflict air-operations by geographic responsibility, the precursor to the route pack system utilized by the Navy in Vietnam.
The independent operations of the Air Force and Navy during the Korean War were a truly disjointed effort. However, many valuable lessons can be drawn from Korea for our proposed JFMCC C2 system. Foremost, develop doctrine and lessons learned from previous military experience (WWII in this case) to serve as a flexible paradigm for future operations. Next, train jointly, emphasizing effective theater C2, during peacetime conditions to validate the doctrine. Unfortunately, the successful C2 and air-centric lessons learned from the Southwest Pacific campaigns of WWII were not developed as training doctrine during the interwar years and hence were "forgotten" when the Korean War commenced.
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Vietnam For the scope of this research paper, the main lesson learned from the Vietnam War is the total lack of unity of effort for air-centric operations between the Air Force and Navy. victory, the lack of joint cooperation between the Air Force and Navy was significant.
The following reveals the sophomoric relationship between the Air Force and Navy:
"The Navy and Air Force wrangled about matters both foolish and urgent. The Navy resented aircraft rules of engagement-instructions to pilots on when they could and could not shoot, written by the Air Force-which discriminated against Navy planes because they lacked redundant electronic means of distinguishing friend from foe. The Air Force in turn berated Navy pilots in the Gulf for often failing to broadcast the electronic signal that indicated they were indeed friend and not foe."
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In closing our Gulf War analysis, the ATO was also a basic form of C2 friction between the Air Force and Navy. As unbelievable as it sounds today, the Navy required the ATO to be flown out to each of its six aircraft carriers daily-the communication systems between Riyadh and the aircraft carriers could not communicate with each other. 18 Throughout the 1990's the Air Force and Navy "grudge match" resurfaced in Balkan operations with respect to the JFACC and ATO process. A major lesson re-learned from the Bosnia and Kosovo air-centric operations was that the "age-old" operational variables of climate and geography can negate technical wizardry (i.e. "smart" bombs). Much to the chagrin of "air campaign" planners, the paradigm of flat, stationary "Visual Flight Rules" (VFR) targets of the Gulf War were hard to come by during air-centric operations against targets in the mountainous Balkans. On a more positive note, the Navy was The well known images of SOF operating high-technology digital data, video and communication systems while riding horses with wooden saddles reaffirms USSOCOM's mandate that "SOF personnel will be required to operate increasingly sophisticated equipment and to perform operations in a technologically advanced threat environment, while remaining masters of the low and no-technology environments." 23 Applying this paradigm, it is of paramount importance that our JFMCC self-contained theater C2 system can function in both the "ops-normal" net-centric environment, and a degraded environment.
C2 and the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
The floating infrastructure and self-contained nature of the JFMCC command structure are major selling points for this papers' proposal of providing stand alone degraded operations C2. The sea basing of C2 is nothing new. "Sea based command and control (C2) originated during World War II when the Navy converted 17 merchant hulls into amphibious force command ships. In the early 1950s, the heavy cruiser
Northampton (CG-1) was converted into a light command ship, and replaced a decade later when the light carrier Wright (CC-2) was reconfigured as a command ship." 24 There are four command ships in service presently in the Navy. "Of the four command ships in service today, two-the Mount Whitney (LCC-20) and the Blue Ridge (LCC-19)-were the first ever designed from the keel up to provide sea-based C2." 25 The USS Mount Whitney has participated in contingency operations from Haiti to current operations in the continuing war on terrorism as the headquarters for Joint Task Force
Horn of Africa. 26 Additionally, she has participated in numerous Joint Fleet Exercises (JTFEX). 27 For the purposes of this paper, the Mount Whitney will be analyzed as the platform for integrating a SOLE function into the JFMCC staff. compelling selling point of the JFMCC platform is that it provides a commander some degree of geographic proximity to the area of operations.
JFMCC -SOLE Integration
Integrating a SOLE function into the JFMCC's staff will embed invaluable expertise and liaison capability for proper employment of SOF (air and ground "The assignment of SOF air assets is an example of the geographic commander's direction for SOF employment and command relationships. To assure centralized control and decentralized execution to all SOF-assigned missions, the JFC may designate that all SOF air assets remain under the OPCON of the JFSOCC. The JFSOCC may pass TACON of available SOF air assets to the JFACC or other component commanders when appropriate. Regardless of SOF aviation C2 arrangements, SOF aviation operations must be closely coordinated with the JFACC in order to ensure airspace deconfliction, flight safety, and operations security (OPSEC)." 34 The necessity of the SOLE in coordinating SOF and air-centric operations is of paramount importance for the JFMCC C2 system. 
